Peter did not follow any prescribed or established methods to achieve his goals for the economic development of the country, in spite of his organization of manufacturing and mining. Although he generally subscribed to the mercantilistic theories of his time and attempted to reduce imports by the exploitation of domestic resources and the encouragement of indigenous manufacturing, he did not imitate the systematic economic policies of his contemporaries in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the results that he achieved were the outcome of preconceived ideas and clearly identified priorities. In that framework of development, defense considerations for St. Petersburg and its region played a major role.
The decision by Peter the Great to build a new capital and to develop its manufactures must be considered in the context of the situation that Russia faced at that time. Peter considered Russia to be a backward country that required Westernization and modernization. A new, Western-oriented capital, located nearer the rest of Europe than "oriental" Moscow, would hasten these processes. Russia was then contesting with Sweden for supremacy in the Baltic area. The founding of St. Petersburg was designed to consolidate Russian control over its newly won coastal territory and to serve as a major naval base. A third factor influencing Peter's decision was that Russian trade with the West was through the northern port of Arkhangelsk, which was distant from the western European ports and had a severe winter climate. The newly opened Baltic route was shorter and had a longer navigational season. Those factors provided the incentive to establish the new city and influenced the development of its functions.
The location of the new city had certain serious disadvantages. The city was founded on an uninhabited swampy site, subject to periodic flooding, in a sparsely populated region with little local agriculture or manufacturing. Those conditions not only created grave technological problems for the construction of the city but also required the formation of a large labor force recruited from other regions of Russia. In spite of those difficulties, the population of the city numbered some 40,000 by the mid-1720s and was more than double that figure by the 1750s. The rapid expansion of the city was accompanied by the development of various manufactural establishments in the city and its surrounding region (Fig. 1) . DEFENSE 
MANUFACTURES
The most important factor to be considered initially in an assessment of the aims of Peter the Great in the development of manufacturing is the strategic one. St. Petersburg was founded during a long and hard struggle between the Russians and the Swedes for the mastery of the Baltic Sea. The founding of the city in 1703 occurred near the beginning of a long war that lasted until 1721. In 1703 and 1704 the Swedish fleet still threatened the existence of the new city, and the Swedes attempted an attack by land in 1705. Although the concept of St. Petersburg as a "window on Europe" should not be deemphasized, the phrase "from here we shall threaten the Swede"5 has great relevance in ex-plaining the early development of the city and its manufactural activities.. Although the site of the city was unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of environment, it was the only suitable place on the Baltic coast accessible at that time to the Russians. The construction of the Peter and Paul fortress as the first building in the projected city and the concurrent fortification of Kotlin Island emphasized the importance of defense. After the Battle of Poltava in 1709 and the defeat of Charles XII of Sweden, Peter the Great wrote, "Now with the help of God a perfect stone has been laid in the foundation of St. Petersburg."6 It was not until the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 that Russia gained complete control over Estonia and the Karelian Isthmus and achieved the protection required to ensure a certain future for the new city. The concern for protection was the major impetus for the development of defense-oriented manufactures in and around St. Petersburg during the first two decades of its existence.
The admiralty wharf was built on the bank of the Neva River opposite the protective guns of the Peter and Paul fortress. That wharf became the largest enterprise in the city during the first half of the eighteenth century. It launched its first ship in 1706. Artisans were brought from the small wharves in the Olonets region, from the Novgorod region, and from Rostov. The wharf employed 900 workers in 1709, and during the next twenty years large numbers of workers came to the wharf from many parts of Russia. The government in 1710 ordered 4,720 laborers to the city to work at the admiralty wharf and in the construction of the city.7 Two years later, another 2,000 men came from the wharf at Voronezh, established to supply ships for Peter's unsuccessful attempt to gain access to the Black Sea in 1695-1696. One thousand carpenters were ordered to the city in 1713. That year was the height of the war with Sweden. The admiralty wharf then had 10,000 workers, but by 1727 the number dropped to 4,672.8
STATE MANUFACTURES AND THE LABOR FORCE
The development of the admiralty wharf set the pattern for the operation of much manufacturing in St. Petersburg: state-owned with workers often obtained by forcible recruitment from other parts of Russia. The lack of workers to labor for hire on a voluntary basis led to the employment of state serfs. Many artisans with their families were sent permanently to St. Petersburg. For example, in 1720 the government dispatched an officer to the villages in the region west of Vologda to bring 413 carpenters to the capital for shipbuilding. Many persons so conscripted never arrived at the capital.9 Of the 6,597 persons sent in 1712 from the Moscow, Smolensk, Kazan, and Arkhangelsk regions, 842 persons did not reach St. Petersburg: 14 died, 387 became ill and stopped en route, and 441 escaped.10
The organization of a manufactural labor force was a major problem for Peter the Great. He operated in a system of serfdom inherited from his predecessors, and, like the serfs, he was unable to escape it. He placed heavy The preference for a predominantly state-owned manufactural system was not solely the consequence of using serfs as the principal component of the labor force but also was due to the necessity for rapidly increased production for defense needs. State ownership was abandoned to a great extent in the 1720s when private manufacturers were encouraged to assume a number of state enterprises. Private manufacturers were permitted to buy entire villages, whose inhabitants were thus permanently tied to a particular enterprise. Serfs were also assigned to certain factories, a practice that led to friction between merchants and nobles over the rights to the compulsory labor of the serfs. On the whole, Peter's labor policies lacked consistency and were not markedly successful. 12 
SHIPBUILDING AND TIMBER SUPPLIES
Although the admiralty wharf was the most important shipyard in the region, the Olonets wharf at Lodeynoye Pole on the Svir River launched the first warship of the Baltic fleet in August, 1703. Ships built there, however, had to make the difficult passage over the rapids in the Neva River in order to reach St. Petersburg and the sea. After 1702 ships were built along the banks of the Svir River, at the mouth of the Syas River, and along the Volkhov and Neva rivers. Because of the problems of moving the finished ships to St. Petersburg, Peter decided to make his city the major shipbuilding center.13 But other centers of shipbuilding were not prohibited or neglected. The wharf at Kronstadt on Kotlin Island had 1,140 workers by 1727, and the private wharf in St. Petersburg had approximately 500 workers. The latter produced mainly small vessels, as did other small wharves in the city.14 A satisfactory supply of ship timber was a major problem. Although the wharves of St. Petersburg were close to coniferous forests, their timber was suitable for masts, but not for planking and other timber needs for ships. Oak timber was necessary, and little of it was available in the St. Petersburg region. A German forester, ordered to mark all oaks in the forests of Ingria, now the western half of the Leningrad oblast, and in the Novgorod region, found none to mark. Peter ordered two old oaks on Kotlin Island to be preserved as examples, and he established a nursery for oaks along the road to Petergof.15 Those efforts, however, did not yield any significant production of oaken ship timber. The supplies had to come from farther afield. The upper Volga region, especially around Alatyr and Sergach, became the major supply areas, and Kazan was an important center for processing timber for shipbuilding in St. Petersburg.16 The timber was sawed in local sawmills, some of which were already under construction at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
The growth of shipbuilding was a great impetus to regional sawmilling, although the rate of expansion was not as rapid as hoped. The Swedes constructed small sawmills near Shlissel'burg, which fell into the hands of the Russians. The first new sawmills were built in St. Petersburg, but later ones were located along the Neva, the Izhora, the Tosna, and other nearby streams.17 The choice of site was influenced by the supply of wood, the existence of water routes, and the possibility of using waterpower. A few wind-driven sawmills appeared, at first on Vasilevskiy Island and later on the banks of the Moyka River. The sawmills on the Izhora were the largest. Including the persons employed in the timber storehouses, there were 279 workers at the admiralty sawmill at Kolpino, and an additional 820 persons loaded wood, carried planks, and did other chores in 1715.18 That mill had 135 artisans and apprentices in 1725, a time of peace. By the end of the 1720s the St. Petersburg region had more than ten sawmills, and thirty-two such mills by 1754.19 Most were stateowned and supplied the shipbuilding manufacturers, although some mills supplied construction timber to the city. Private enterprise was limited, and the few private mills either were auxiliary to large state-owned enterprises or concentrated on export.
Other centers of sawmilling emerged in northwest Russia. In 1706 the first sawmill in Arkhangelsk began operation. The presence of a state-shipbuilding wharf there encouraged the construction of additional mills. One was built at Narva, and timber exported from there. There were also two sawmills in the Novgorod region, one on the Syas River and one near Vyshni Volochek, both thus on water routes to the capital.20 The supply of timber for the capital was never sufficient, in spite of the creation of forest reserves and the promulgation of severe penalties for the private cutting of ship timber. After Peter's death in 1725, the neglect of the fleet led to the closing of many sawmills in the St. Petersburg region.
ARMAMENTS MANUFACTURES
The production of metals, especially iron and copper, was closely allied to shipbuilding. The new fleet required cannons, anchors, chains, and other metal equipment, while the army needed cannons, muskets, swords, uniform buttons, and a host of other metal items. The unsuccessful siege of Narva in 1700 revealed the inferior quality of Russian-made weapons, and Peter determined to improve it. Until the opening of the Great Northern War, Russia relied on 16 imports of iron from Sweden. An indigenous armaments manufacture, supplying good-quality weapons from Russian-made metals, was essential.
The first major establishment for the manufacture of cannons in St. Petersburg was the pushechno-liteynyy dvor (cannon-casting foundry), located east of the admiralty wharf. Built between 1711 and 1713 the foundry first produced brass cannons; after 1717 the cannons were cast and then bored by horsepowered lathes. Attempts to use waterpower were unsuccessful.21 In June, 1714, there were thirty-seven workers at the foundry. That year approximately onethird to one-half of the workers, mostly artisans, at the Moscow cannon foundry moved to St. Petersburg, so that the total number of workers there rose to 200. Fifty gunsmiths came permanently from Tula in 1716, but the stay of other transported workers was only temporary. In 1720 the foundry was renamed the Arsenal, and by the mid-1720s it employed 214 artisans.22 The Arsenal was never a large enterprise, because the lack of waterpower restricted expansion, although proximity to the admiralty wharf was an obvious locational advantage.
Other metalworking factories were not so conveniently located. An armaments factory was built between 1721 and 1723 at Sestroretsk on a site selected because of the favorable conditions for the use of waterpower. That factory was one of the largest and technically one of the best metalworking factories established by Peter the Great. It manufactured guns, bayonets, swords, pistols, anchors, nails, wire, and tinplate. In 1727 there were 653 workers, many of whom came from factories in Moscow, Tula, and Olonets. The supplies of iron came mainly from the Urals.23
A small iron factory, originally operating at Ladoga on the southern shore of Lake Ladoga to service the fleet, was moved to Kronstadt in 1722, but it was merged with the Sestroretsk factory two years later.24 Using waterpower, the old Izhora state sawmill at Kolpino began to produce anchors and copper plates for ship bottoms in 1719, but the equipment was taken to the new factory at Sestroretsk in 1724.25
METALLURGICAL MANUFACTURES
The absence of deposits of metallic ores in the vicinity of St. Petersburg was a deterrent to the development of iron-ore processing in or around the city. The activities were thus dispersed far from the consumers. Peter particularly designated the Olonets region of Karelia on the western shores of Lake Onega for development. Smelting of iron and copper ores dated to early times, and iron manufacturing had considerable development there by the end of the seventeenth century. The state was initially interested in copper production. Between 1666 and 1674 efforts to increase the scale of copper production were 21 unsuccessful. Production of iron was considerable by the 1680s, although the exact number of factories is unknown. Russian and Karelian iron masters were the main operators. Local free peasants were the hired labor in contrast with the use of foreign artisans and serfs in the activity elsewhere in Russia. The factories used waterpower. Unrest among the peasant laborers in the 1680s and 1690s affected the operations of the factories. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Peter's desire for a rapid increase in Russian iron production led to the expansion of Olonets production. The factories were privately owned until 1703 when they were taken over by the state.26
THE OLONETS IRON MANUFACTURES
Peter the Great had firsthand knowledge of the potential of the Olonets region as a source of metallic ores (Fig. 2) . When he was exploring the possibilities of a rapid route between Arkhangelsk and Lake Ladoga in 1702, he met some Olonets peasants who were digging ores and learned from them of the extent of the copper and iron deposits in the region.27 He ordered the construction of three new factories in the same year. The Alekseyevskiy factory was located on the northern slope of a ridge forming the watershed between the White Sea and Lake Onega near the mouth of the Telekina River. The factory had two blast furnaces with hammers. The Povenetskiy factory was founded approximately twenty-five miles to the south on the Povenets River. That factory had four blast furnaces, hammers, a wire-making machine, and an anchor smithy with four forges. The Vichkovskiy factory was on the bank of the Vichka River, some twenty miles from the Povenetskiy factory. There were a blast furnace, two forges, and hammers. A fourth factory was established in 1703 on the Lososinka River where it flows into Lake Onega. Named the Petrovskiy factory, it was built in a record three months and became the largest in the region with four blast furnaces, a water-powered cannon-borer, an anchor workshop, machines to draw wire, and a weapon workshop for guns and swords. The factory employed almost 1,000 workers and by 1725 produced approximately 60 percent of the pig-iron production of the Olonets region. The Konchezerskiy factory was built in 1707 some twenty-five miles to the north of the Petrovskiy factory on the channel between lakes Pertnavolok and Konchezerskoye. Those factories were organized under united management as the Olonets factories. Of the old Olonets factories that were taken over by the state in 1703, all were closed, except the Ust'retskiy factory which remained in operation. 28 The Olonets factories concentrated on the production of heavy cannons and anchors. At first the operation of the factories was badly organized, and techniques were primitive. Organization and production were greatly improved by the 1720s, but output was limited. Local ores were depleted, and a shortage 26 factory. The Konchezerskiy was not operating in 1727. The Povenetskiy factory was transferred to private ownership in 1726 and then liquidated. Later it was decided to cease the casting of cannons at the Petrovskiy factory and to transfer the activity to the reactivated Konchezerskiy factory. Although it has the best location for the extraction of ore, the Konchezerskiy factory was badly situated in terms of transportation. It was far from Lake Onega, and the channel between the lakes on which it was located had a shallow depth.31
The period of maximum production for the Olonets factories was shortlived. Because of the rising costs of production-the cost of pig iron from the Petrovskiy and Konchezerskiy factories in 1727 was ten times more than pig iron from the state factories in the Urals-the Admiralty began to look carefully at cost factors after the end of the Great Northern War in 1721. Then also the reduced scale of shipbuilding lowered demand for naval equipment and armaments. Those In 1725 a gunpowder factory was built at the Sestroretsk armaments factory. It had seventy-five employees in 1727 and produced more powder than the other installations in the region, the chief consumer being the fleet. Some powder was also produced at the Arsenal. 54 In spite of Peter's decree, by 1725 Moscow still produced more gunpowder than did St. Petersburg. 55 The reason for that situation was probably the closer proximity of Moscow to supplies of sulfur and saltpeter. In the seventeenth century supplies of those materials came partially from abroad. However, with the advent of the war with Sweden, the further development of domestic sources became necessary. Sulfur came mainly from the state factories at Sergiyevsk and Samara (present-day Kuybyshev) in the Volga region. There was also a factory in the Moscow area. Saltpeter came from the central Ukraine and from Tsaritsyn (present-day Volgograd) and Astrakhan on the Volga. Peter particularly encouraged the saltpeter manufacture.56 Transportation of the raw materials by river routes to Moscow was easier and more rapid than to St. Petersburg. Charcoal was obtained from local sources.
Allied to the manufacture of gunpowder was the production of special parchment cartridges for the charges of naval guns. Two admiralty factories produced those cartridges. One was located in St. Petersburg and the other at Dudergof (present-day Krasnoye Selo), south of the city, where a paper factory was also sited.57 Skins for the parchment probably came from local leather factories.
